Ursinus Intro Ethics Blog - Section B

Initially, I thought that Kant was calling all inclinations negative in that they led a person away from morality. After class and looking at the text again, I am no longer as convinced that is the case. While Kant says that pathological love and tender sympathy cannot be commanded for the sake of duty and willed action, he never states that they take away from morality. After giving the examples of the different people (which I initially took to be saying that the philanthropist who no longer has sympathy but acts out of duty was the only moral person and the rest were not) says that the example of the person acting from duty not inclination brings out the moral worth so we can see that duty is the most important thing of all. Even though spreading joy for pleasure "has nevertheless no true moral worth," Kant here seems to be saying that this is the case only when duty is not involved at all. I initially was reading this as "finding pleasure in spreading joy which is done out of duty has no moral worth" which confused me. Also, this does not mean it is impossible to be moral if you find happiness in acting in accordance with duty. In fact, we have a duty to promote happiness even when there is no inclination to do so. At the same time, I am waiting to see what Kant has to say about these things in particular later on. After the example about the man wishing for death but preserving his life out of duty as an example of something having moral worth, I am still tempted to think Kant is calling for a life of maxims that require doing what we have the strongest aversions to without destroying themselves should they become universal laws. I will resist until I hear more about inclinations occurring because of action based on duty.